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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD REJECT UDOT'S ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A
BRIGHT-LINE ABUTMENT REQUIREMENT.
UDOT does not dispute that the facts in Ivers v. Utah Dep H ofTransp., 2007 UT

19, 154 P.3d 802, and Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974),
are essentially identical to the facts of the present case. UDOT only claims that because
Admiral's property abutted 500 West as opposed to 1-15 prior to the take it must be
denied any claim for severance damages.
In the Ivers and Miya cases, just as in the present case, condemned property was
taken "in order to build a . . . frontage road parallel to, and connecting with, the newly
widened and elevated highway . . . [and] the condemned land was used for the creation of
the frontage road and improvement on Shepherd Lane." Ivers, 2007 UT 19,fflf2-3. Also
as in Ivers and Miya, upon UDOT's completion of the frontage road, the remainder
property abuts the property taken and improved by UDOT. Finally, in all three cases, the
property was taken by UDOT as part of a single, comprehensive highway reconstruction
project. Here, title to the Admiral parcels was taken in the name of UDOT rather than
Salt Lake City, and the construction of both the frontage road and the storm sewer were
undertaken by UDOT without involvement of the City. Moreover, both of the parcels
taken were an essential part of the 1-15 project. Without the relocated frontage road and
the storm drain, the project could not have been completed "in the manner proposed" by
UDOT.

1

UDOT's claim, that Admiral has no right to severance damages because its
property abutted 500 West prior to the take is not supported by any of the cases it has
cited nor by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-511(2)\ None of the cases cited
by UDOT involved private property separated from the highway by an adjoining frontage
road that was taken by UDOT and used as an essential part of a single, comprehensive
highway reconstruction project. Contrary to UDOT's assertions, the Utah Supreme Court
has not addressed this specific situation. This is an issue of first impression.
In Miya, after the frontage road was completed by UDOT. Miya 's remainder
property remained separated from the 25-foot high overpass by the width of the new
frontage road. Yet. the Supreme Court held that just compensation damages must be paid
for the diminished value of Miya's property. See Miya, 526 P.2d at 929. Likewise, in
Ivers, this Court reached a similar holding even though the condemned property was used
for the creation of the frontage road as opposed to the highway itself:
With respect to lost view. se"\ erance damages are appropriate under Utah
Code section 78-34-10 where a portion of property is condemned by the
state and the condemnation of that land causes damage to the
noncondemned portion of land. Damage to the noncondemned portion of
land is "caused" bv the severance . . . when the vievs -impairing structure is
built on land other than the condemned land, but the condemned land is
used as part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of the
project.
Ivers. 2007 UT 19. ^ 26 (emphasis added).
UDOT seeks to distinguish Ivers and Mh a. and preclude application of Utah Code
Ann. §"8B-6-511(2) to Admiral's property because it abutted 500 West prior to the take.
1

In 2008. the Utah State Legislature renumbered Utah Code Ann { "'S-S-^-lO as § "83-6-511
For ease of reference. Admiral will refer to the eurren: ^ ersion of the statute m its ?veo'*\ 3nef

The express terms of that statute, however, make no exception for properties separated
from the highway by an adjoining frontage road. See id.
Moreover, the Court's recent decision in Ivers requires only that "the condemned
land is used as part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of the
project." As noted above, the Admiral propeity was taken by UDOT as an essential part
of the 1-15 reconstruction project. The Court should reject UDOT's attempt to impose a
bright-line abutment rule under these circumstances.
II.

ADMIRAL IS ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE
PROPERTY TAKEN BY UDOT.
Amendment V of the United States Constitution and Article I. Section 22 of the

Utah Constitution prohibit the taking of private property without just compensation. The
Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 in an effort to further define
the specific elements of just compensation. The compensation to which an owner is
entitled for "severance damage" to the remainder under subsection (2) of Section 511 is
the difference in the fair market value of the owner's remaining property before and after
the taking. See, e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 247 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952); Carpet Bam v. State, 786 P.2d 770, 772-73
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Such a determination can only be made by considering all of the
relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value:
In making the [severance damage] appraisal it is not only permissible, but
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a prudent and
willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into
account in arriving at market value.

J.D. Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, p. 316 (1995) (quoting State Road Com %n
v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1971)). The effect of the taking on fair market value,
therefore, should be the focal point of the- assessment of severance damages to the
remainder in the present case.
This Court has clearly set the rules by which just compensation for such a taking
should be determined:
For compensation to be fair and just it must reflect fair value of the land to
the landowner. Just compensation means the owners must be put in as
good a position money wise as they would have occupied had their property
not been taken.
Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984).
In an effort to avoid paying just compensation to Admiral, UDOT asked the trial
court to segregate out certain elements of damages that obviously affect the fair market
value of the Admiral remainder property. Such a position is directly contrary to this
Court's decision in State Road Comm 'n v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971). In Rohan,
the State Road Commission argued that it was improper to permit the defendants' expert
to take into consideration and testify concerning diminution in value resulting from
increased noise from the highway. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's position
and held that the testimony of the expert who considered the increase in noise was
properly allowed, notwithstanding the fact that it would have been improper to segregate
and evaluate noise as a separate item of damage. The Rohan court held:
there should not be anv attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of
damage am loss of value due to noise or anv other such intangible factor:
and this is true even where there has been an actual taking of property. An}7
such attempt to so segregate and place a separate money value on the effect
4

the factor of noise would have upon property would inevitably involve the
uncertainty and impracticability above referred to in this decision. This
should not be done either for the purpose of making an award of a separate
item of damage, as was dealt with in the Williams case, nor for the purpose
of fixing a separate amount to be deducted from the severance damage to
the remaining property as plaintiff contends here.
On the other hand, in order to correctly evaluate the severance damages,
i.e., the damage to the remaining property, it is obvious that it should be
viewed in the composite as it will be after the taking and after the
improvement has been constructed. In making the appraisal it is not only
permissible but necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that
a prudent and willing buver and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would
take into account in arriving at its market value. The testimony of the
defendant's expert which is here under attack indicates that he conformed
to that formula. He properly and candidly included the facts that the new
freeway adjacent to the property, with the attendant increase in traffic and
noises, were among the factors considered in making his appraisal. But
there was no attempt to segregate and place a separate money value
thereon. We think the trial court was well advised in admitting his
testimony and that no prejudicial error was committed.
Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
UDOT criticized the Rohan decision in the trial court-referring to it as an
"embarrassment to the Court." (R. 994 at 48-49.) Unfortunately for UDOT, Rohan has
never been overturned and remains binding case law in the State of Utah. Now. UDOT
has changed its tune and is attempting to distinguish Rohan from the present case. These
efforts have likewise been unsuccessful.
In an effort to distinguish the clear holding of Rohan. UDOT argues that unlike
view and visibility in this case, which UDOT maintains are not compensable, the Rohan
decision "cited to orior lavs of Utah as to when an increase of noise can be considered a
J-

compensable damage claim/* UDOT's Brief at 16 (citing Rohan. 487 P.2d at 858 n.4).
VvTiat UDOT ignores. ho\* ever, is the fact that the Court's ultimate decision in Rohan had
"S

nothing to do with whether some prior Utah decision allowed a recovery for noise under
certain circumstances.

Rather, the Court's decision in Rohan was based upon the

fundamental rule that:
"there should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item
of damage any loss of value due to noise or any other such intangible factor
. . . . This should not be done either for the purpose of making an award of
a separate item of damage. . . . nor for the purpose of fixing a separate
amount to be deducted from the severance damage to the remaining
property."
Id. at 859.2 Accordingly, UDOT's efforts to undermine and distinguish this Court's prior
decision in Rohan should be rejected.

III. UDOT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED A WINDFALL AT ADMIRAL'S
EXPENSE.
As demonstrated in UDOT's Opening Brief, the decision to eliminate the value of
view from the property from fail* market value provides a very significant windfall in the
amount of that value to UDOT at Admiral's expense. See Admiral's Opening Brief at
15-16. The harshness of the trial court's ruling is demonstrated by Admiral's purchase of
the property for its appraised fair market value, which clearly included both the value of

" It should also be noted that UDOT cites to Twenty--Second Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 103 P. 243 (Utah 1909). in support of its
argument. However, the language of that decision quoted by UDOT actual!}' supports Admiral's
position that the trial court must consider all factors that affect the fair market value of the
property. See UDOT's Brief at 16-17 (citing Oregon Short Line. 103 P. 243 ("In that class of
cases noises and similar interferences which ma}' affect the market value of the property not
taken are ordinarih permitted to be shown, not as independent elements of damage, but as
elements to be considered in connection with all other things which ma\ depreciate the market
value of the propers interfered with but not taken.")) (emphasis added). That is exacth what
Admiral did in this case. J err} Weber's expert appraisal report determined se^ erance damages to
the remainder, based upon all of the factors that a prudent and willing buyer and seller, with
knowledge of the facts, would take into account in arriving at fair market value, including but not
limned to. viev and visibilit}
6

view and visibility, only to have UDOT take the property without paying any
compensation for view or visibility.

This violates the constitutional mandate that

property not be taken without payment of just compensation. See Utah Const. Art. L §
22; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 352 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1960) ("The standard of what
is 'just compensation' in the ordinary case is the market value of the property taken, that
is what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.").
UDOT failed to provide any meaningful response to this argument. Rather, it has
tried to focus the Court's attention on technicalities, such as the supposed abutment rule.
Nevertheless, the Court should not lose sight of the fact that the decision to eliminate the
value of view from the property from fair market value is extremely unfair and
inequitable to Admiral, and violates the constitutional mandate of just compensation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it was error to exclude evidence of Admiral's severance
damages relating to loss of view from the remaining property. Therefore, the Court
should reverse the trial court's December 27, 2007 Minute Entry and the Memorandum
Decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this matter for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's ruling herein.
DATED this _ 2 i ^ d a y of August. 2009.
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
i^£*<

Reed L. Martineau
D. Jason Hawkins
Attorneys for Defendant Appellant
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